No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy.
Horatio Nelson
No captain
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14 thoughts on “No captain”
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No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy.
Horatio Nelson
Comments are closed.
What has always amazed me is how they did all that by sail alone. That’s pretty good sailing.
As the guy who questioned the authenticity of PG’s last Nelson quote I think I should say that Edwin need not doubt the authenticity in this case. It comes from Nelson’s memorandum of 9 October and the slightly fuller version is “In case Signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.”
In the 18th century naval combat had been fairly indecisive with fleets holding fast to their battle lines and cannonading each other with no great result. As other commentators have indicated Nelson’s aim was to achieve decisive results by breaking the battle line and bringing about a melee in which, in the case of Trafalgar, the whole British fleet would overwhelm the rear ⅔rds of the Franco-Spanish fleet. In this kind of battle command and control went by the board in the smoke and confusion and you had to rely on your captains doing the right thing – basically find an enemy and get stuck in at close range. Hence the last signal from Victory during the battle was “engage the enemy more closely”.
Mike Hall,
Really?
So the Capture of Givraltar (1704), the Battle of Quiberon Bay (1759), the Battle of St Kitts (1782), the Battle of the Saintes (1782), the Indian campaign of Suffren (1782), and The Glorious First of June (1794) were indecisive?
My comment about 18th century naval warfare was a deliberate generalisation intended to point out how things had changed by the time of Trafalgar. They were really about the inability of the “line to line” formation imposed by the permanent fighting instructions to achieve decisive tactical results by capturing or destroying large numbers of ships. As the battles you mention show it was still possible to achieve decisive strategic results.
Where I was wrong was in using the term “indecisive”. Though basically correct in terms of tactics and casualties – see for example the Battle of the Chesapeake (1781) or the Battle of Minorca (1756) – as you point out the strategic consequences could still be decisive, in these cases the fall of Yorktown and of Port Mahon respectively.
The Battle of the Saintes is interesting as it could easily have ended up tactically indecisive with limited casualties and damage had someone not finally decided to break the French line (assuming it was not accidental) – foreshadowing later naval tactics – though the French losses (5 ships out of 33) were still comparatively low. The Glorious First of June is a kind of follow up to this and a precursor to Trafalgar in that Howe did at least intend all his ships to break the line, though the implementation was faulty and the result was a major British tactical victory and a decisive French strategic one.
The Battle of Quiberon Bay (1759) was certainly decisive – 7 out of 21 French ships lost and another 6 or so out of action for the rest of the war – but also untypical as once general chase was signalled the restrictions imposed by the Fighting Instructions no longer applied (plus few battles were fought in a gale and amidst reefs and shoals).
Mike Hall, I am quite pleased to see that you do know your naval history. Fair winds and following seas.
That depends on who has the better broadside …
(Nose on reduces the target they have to shoot at and protects your rudder – all the better if you have a bow built for ramming!)
Didn’t Nelson also supposedly say “never mind the manoevres, always go straight at them”?
He always seemed a bit tactically suspect to me…
Not at all. That quote, if it’s authentic, is about aggression: don’t get fancy, get stuck in.
AlexB,
If you want tactical finesse, look to Stephen Decatur (American) or Edward Pellew (British), frigate captains. In fleet actions, Nelson won at Copenhagen, the Nile, and Trafalgar. In fleet actions, tactics go hang. Play to your strength. That’s what Nelson did.
In Nelson’s time, ships generally didn’t have rams.
Actually, the ideal tactic was to fire your broadside at the enemy’s bow or, ideally, stern. That way a 74 could bring 37 guns to bear while the enemy might be able to reply with one or two.
At Trafalgar, Nelson, famously, allowed the enemy several minutes of unanswered fire at extended ranges at the British bows while they closed. Then, the British ships cut between the French and Spanish ships and responded with devastating short-range broadside to the enemy’s bows and sterns.
Crossing the T:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crossing_the_T
In David Weber’s Honorverse series future space warfare evolved back to tactics “suspiciously” like Napoleonic era sea combat.
…Until the tricky Manties and Graysons reinvent MIRVs and Carriers…
Given that Weber is a historian and his milieu is blatantly Napoleonic it was quite appropriate. Especially since the Honor Harrington series is a very Hornblower-ish. Or Nelson-ish, all things considered. 🙂
Of course, run their guns hot and tire their men before coming in with your men still fresh and your guns primed.
This was the age of black powder. Your first shot was the best aimed. After that, the smoke from your own guns filled the gun deck and made visibility poor.
The British exercised their mean at rapidity of fire and let marksmanship go hang. That is the main reason they sought to lay their ships within pistol shot of the enemy (30-60 paces), so they could not miss. Because they fired three volleys to the French two, they expected to win. And much more often than not, they did.
And the cannon were in ‘tracks’ – thus running them in and out and gave meaning to the order ‘fire as you bare!’ as they were more aimed by ship’s movements than by the gunner. And while knocking holes in them was nice, taking out their rudders or masts meant they could no longer maneuver against you.
Just as glad I didn’t live in that age, there was enough stuff on your own ship trying to kill you without an enemy trying to ‘help’.