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13	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
14	CENTRAL DISTRIC	CT OF CALIFORNIA	
15	PAMELA DUMOND, an individual,	Case No. 2:19-cv-08922-GW-AGR	
16 17	Plaintiff, vs.	REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST	
18 19 20	FARRAH REILLY, a/k/a EMMA CHASE, an individual; EMMA CHASE, LLC; and DIVERSION PUBLISHING CORPORATION, d/b/a EVERAFTER ROMANCE,	AMENDED COMPLAINT Date: April 9, 2020 Time: 8:30 a.m. Crtrm: 9D	
21 22	Defendants		
4411	Defendants.		
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The back-to-back reading of Plaintiff's Novel *Part-Time Princess* and Defendants' Novel *Royally Screwed* leads to but one inescapable conclusion: the novels are not substantially similar. Beyond both works' unprotectable Cinderellastory premise, the Novels plainly differ with respect to every expressive element relevant to the Ninth Circuit's extrinsic similarity test: their "plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence" are not at all similar. *Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television*, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994). *See* Section III.A.

Plaintiff acknowledges, as she must, that for decades, courts have and regularly do dismiss copyright claims where the works at issue are properly before the court. Opp. at 12; *Zella v. E.W. Scripps Co.*, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (explaining that "[f]or fifty years, courts have ... dismissed copyright claims that fail from the face of the complaint (and in light of all matters properly considered on a motion to dismiss)"). Put simply, the Court can and should analyze the works at issue and dismiss Plaintiff's claims as a matter of law.

Despite this acknowledged reality, Plaintiff attempts to sidestep the necessary comparison between her Novel and Defendants' Novel, by a series of misguided and unfounded arguments. Plaintiff puts most weight behind a new theory not even alleged in her complaint, and argues that Defendants must have used computer generated "text spinning" to copy her book, suggesting that this "novel" theory requires discovery. To be clear, Defendants did *not* copy Plaintiff's Novel, by "text spinning" or any other means. But, this argument can be readily dispatched for the simple reason that the means of the alleged copying – whether it be via "text spinning" or a quill pen on parchment – is *irrelevant* to the substantial similarity analysis. The analysis is dictated by the final works and whether their respective

expression is substantially similar. And here, a comparison of the Novels demonstrates that they are *not* similar. *See* Section II.

When Plaintiff finally actually engages in the substantial similarity analysis – the only issue before the Court – it becomes evident that her claim rests on cherry-picked lists of generic, unprotectable, and often mischaracterized elements scattered randomly throughout the works at issue. This is precisely the sort of subjective list that the Ninth Circuit has cautioned courts against relying on to determine substantial similarity. *Litchfield v. Spielberg*, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984). *See* Section III.B. When the actual works are considered, not Plaintiff's characterization of them, it is clear that Plaintiff's romantic comedy about a broke bartender hired to impersonate nobility and seal an engagement and marriage to the crown prince of a fictional Franco-Germanic European country is substantially *dissimilar* to Defendants' bodice-ripper told from both the male and female protagonists' perspectives, in which the crown prince of a fictional nation in the British Isles is ordered to find a suitable bride, but instead abdicates the throne to sleep with and ultimately marry an American pie-baking barista.

In the end, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate the requisite substantial similarity of protected expression between the two Novels. Accordingly, her copyright claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

II. COURTS ROUTINELY DISMISS CLAIMS ON THE PLEADINGS WHEN THE WORKS ARE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR

Courts in the Ninth Circuit routinely dismiss copyright infringement cases where the plaintiff fails to plausibly allege substantial similarity, as determined via the extrinsic test. *See, e.g., Reflex Media, Inc. v. Pilgrim Studios, Inc.*, 2018 WL 6566561, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2018) (Wu, J.) (dismissing complaint for failure to plead substantial similarity); *Silas v. Home Box Office, Inc.*, 201 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (Wu, J.) (same), *aff'd*, 713 F. App'x 626 (9th Cir. 2018); *Heusey v. Emmerich*, 2015 WL 12765115, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2015)

(same), *aff'd*, 692 F. App'x 928 (9th Cir. 2017); *Wild v. NBC Universal, Inc.*, 2011 WL 13272427, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2011) (same), *aff'd*, 513 F. App'x 640 (9th Cir. 2013). *See also* Dkt. 27 at 8-10.

Despite acknowledging that the Ninth Circuit's extrinsic test governs the determination of whether the two works are substantially similar (Opp. at 11), Plaintiff suggests that the Court should nonetheless skip the analysis under three unsupported theories, each of which disregards established Ninth Circuit law.

First, Plaintiff contends that a motion to dismiss is somehow inappropriate in this case because Defendants copied her work via software-facilitated "text spinning." Opp. at 12. But the alleged method of copying does not matter when the works are not substantially similar. To state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must plead that (1) she owns a valid copyright in her work, and (2) the defendant copied protected aspects of the work. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, --- F.3d ----, 2020 WL 1128808, at *8 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2020). The Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed that allegations of copying alone do not satisfy this second prong—rather, a plaintiff still must plausibly allege that the defendant's copying rendered the two works "substantially similar." Id. at *9. Plaintiff's eleventh-hour assertion that Defendants used a complex method of computer-assisted copying as a means to allegedly copy does not suddenly render the two entirely distinct works at issue substantially similar. Plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal by invoking this new theory.

Second, Plaintiff suggests that the Court cannot evaluate substantial similarity without expert testimony (Opp. at 13), but this argument is belied by the many cases dismissing infringement claims for lack of substantial similarity on the pleadings,

¹ Plaintiff's argument is akin to a theory repeatedly rejected by courts: that you can show copying by deconstructing the creation process through a review of unpublished drafts of a work. As this Court has observed, "[b]ecause published works cause injury under copyright law, courts consider the final version of [a work], rather than unpublished scripts." *Silas*, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1169 (citing *Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc.*, 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1360 (C.D. Cal. 1984)).

without any expert testimony. This Court is fully equipped to read and compare 2 two romance novels. Expert testimony is hardly necessary to evaluate extrinsic 3 similarity in a case, like this one, "where the works are targeted at a general 4 audience and deal with subject matter readily understandable by any ordinary 5 person, including the Court." Abdullah v. Walt Disney Co., 2016 WL 7496125, at 6 *2 n.1 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2016) (granting motion to dismiss); "[C]ourts routinely 7 disregard expert testimony in conducting the extrinsic test, even where it is 8 otherwise properly before the court[.]" Shame on You Prods., Inc. v. Banks, 120 F. 9 Supp. 3d 1123, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2015) ("Where, as here, the court conducts an 10 extensive analysis of the alleged similarities between [the] works, ... it is not required to consider expert testimony concerning substantial similarity."), aff'd, 690 F. App'x 519 (9th Cir. 2017). As in *Abdullah* and *Shame on You*, the Court does 13 not need expert testimony to analyze romance novels targeted to the general public. 14 *Finally*, Plaintiff attempts to duck the substantial similarity analysis by 15 contending that the two novels are just too long and contain too much material for 16 the Court to compare on a motion to dismiss. Invoking the easily compared two 17 maps considered 75 years ago in Christianson v. West Publishing Co., Plaintiff 18 suggests that the Court is somehow incapable of reviewing and comparing two 19 books containing hundreds of pages and "different fonts [and] book dimensions." 20 Opp. at 12 (citing *Christianson*, 149 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1945)). This flies in the face of common sense and established law. Courts in this circuit routinely compare 22 and examine lengthy works and complicated works on a motion to dismiss. See,

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(comparing a novel and a screenplay). See also Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming that granting a motion to dismiss may be appropriate whenever both works at issue "are properly before [the court] and thus 'capable of examination and comparison'") (citation omitted)). The works before the Court are straightforward romance novels and each may be read in just a few hours. As courts routinely evaluate works like novels targeted to the general public on a motion to dismiss, this Court should do so here.

III. PLAINTIFF'S NOVEL AND DEFENDANTS' NOVEL ARE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR

In response to Defendants' detailed showing that there is simply no substantial similarity between the Novels, Plaintiff first weakly makes an effort to argue that the protectable elements of the two works are substantially similar, before retreating to the theory that the works are substantially similar due to Plaintiff's Novel's "original selection and arrangement of unprotected elements." Opp. at 21 (quoting *Metcalf v. Bochco*, 294 F.3d 1074, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002)). Neither argument is persuasive and in fact only serves to underscore the inescapable reality that there is simply no substantial similarity between the Novels.²

² Defendants asked this Court to take judicial notice of true and correct physical copies of Plaintiff's Novel and Defendant's Novel. *See* Dkt. 28 at 1-3. Plaintiff concedes that these physical copies are accurate and has not opposed Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice (for the books or the additional generic literary elements identified therein). *See* Dkt. 35 at 2. Instead, Plaintiff inexplicably states that "paper copies of modern romance books are generally regarded as an old-fashioned media" and that "[e]-books and audio books are the modern media for the romance genre." Opp. at 1. The Court should consider the paper copies (*see* Defendants' concurrently filed Objections to Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice), but whether the Court considers the paper copies or the digital versions Plaintiff submitted, the end result is the same: the works clearly are not substantially similar.

A. The Novels' Protectable Elements Are Not Substantially Similar.

The Ninth Circuit's extrinsic test requires the Court to filter out unprotected elements – including basic plot ideas and "standard, stock, or common" elements (*Satava v. Lowry*, 323 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2003)) – and then to compare the works' "articulable similarities between the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events[.]" *Kouf*, 16 F.3d at 1045. *See also* Dkt. 27 at 10-12. Under controlling law, Plaintiff cannot show substantial similarity between the protectable elements of her Novel and Defendants' Novel.

Plot

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In an effort to argue that the Novels' plots are similar, Plaintiff resorts to a comparison at the highest level of abstraction, essentially averring that they are both similar because the heroines "undergo[] a series of romantic adventures" after meeting her love interest. Opp. at 15. Unfortunately, this is the basic premise of essentially every romance novel, and such a generic plot concept is not protectable under copyright law. See, e.g., Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985); see also RJN, Dkt. 28 at 7-8. Indeed, Plaintiff's own summaries make clear that the two works express this unprotectable premise in extraordinarily different ways. In Plaintiff's Novel, the heroine's adventure involves taking a job to impersonate Lady Elizabeth, accepting a proposal of marriage from the crown prince while undercover, falling in love with his younger brother, and dramatically revealing that she is an impersonator to the packed church on her wedding day. Opp. at 4-6. In Defendants' Novel, the heroine's adventure involves falling for Prince Nicholas when he wanders into her family coffee shop in New York, agreeing to travel to his home country and be his mistress while he enters into an arranged marriage with another woman for legal reasons, and then nearly losing him over accusations that she sold the prince out to a tabloid. Opp. at 7-9. The "actual concrete elements" that make up the respective plots are dramatically

different. Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff's abstract assertions of similarity ultimately must be discarded. A down-on-her-luck protagonist is a stock character in romance novels, as are characters who are "sad" after leaving their lover, and the inevitable and ultimate professions of love. *See* RJN, Dkt. 28 at 7-8. More troublingly, several of Plaintiff's purported similarities "significantly misrepresent[] the works in multiple ways." *Silas*, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1173. Thus, for example, Olivia never "freezes" after meeting Nicholas's grandmother. Opp. at 16. Prince Nicholas is not engaged, and Olivia never contends she "should have [been told] about [his] engagement." *Id.* Olivia never expresses "homesick[ness]" after a royal party. *Id.* Prince Nicholas's friend does not "buy [Olivia's] place of employment" (he buys the rights to the recipes for her family's pies). *Id.*

Over and over, Plaintiff's purported plot similarities are mischaracterizations of one or both of the works at issue, or leave out key differences regarding the context of the scenes. For example:

- Plaintiff alleges that both works involve the "Heroine/Hero reminisc[ing] about their lives including 'special reporters.[']" Opp. at 16. In Plaintiff's Novel, however, Lucy flashes back to a plane flight where she was seated near a reporter (Ex. A at 8); whereas, in Defendants' Novel, Prince Nicholas describes his early life during a television interview (Ex. B at 4).
- Plaintiff alleges that in both works, the heroine "is offered a lot of money by a Royal Man." Opp. at 16. In Plaintiff's Novel, Lady Elizabeth offers Lucy a large sum of money to impersonate her (Ex. A at 25, 38); in marked contrast, however, in Defendants' Novel, Prince Nicholas drunkenly offers Olivia a large sum for sexual favors (Ex. B at 33-34).
- Plaintiff alleges that in both works, a "Young Woman helps Heroine pick underwear." Opp. at 16. Yet, in Plaintiff's Novel, Lucy is given new

underwear as part of her new wardrobe to impersonate Lady Elizabeth (Ex. A at 65-66); in Defendants' Novel, Olivia's sister helps her pick out underwear for a date with Nicholas (Ex. B at 70).

- Plaintiff alleges that in both works, the "Hero/Heroine 'flees' a royal ceremony abandoning royal 'job.'" Opp. at 16. However, one of the key distinctions between the plots of the two works is that in Plaintiff's Novel, Lucy flees a wedding after revealing herself as an imposter (Ex. A at 305); in Defendants' Novel, the prince abdicates the throne to be with Olivia (Ex. B at 287). There is nothing similar in how this abandonment occurs.
- Perhaps most revealing of her strained efforts, Plaintiff alleges that in both works, "Heroine munches Cinnamon cereal while Hero comments." Opp. at 16. In Plaintiff's Novel, Lucy eats a cinnamon-raisin granola bar to keep from fainting after a stressful plane flight (Ex. A at 110); in Defendants' Novel, Olivia and Nicholas eat Cinnamon Toast Crunch after a sexual encounter (Ex. B at 118).

These examples underscore that in an effort to manufacture any similarities at all, Plaintiff resorts to twisting reality beyond permissible bounds. The works speak for themselves, and even a cursory review reveals that their plots are entirely dissimilar beyond unprotectable, generic premises that must be filtered out. *See also* Dkt. 27 at 14-16.

Dialogue

As Defendants explained in their opening brief, for a plaintiff to demonstrate substantial similarity of dialogue, it must show "extended similarity of dialogue." *Silas*, 201 F. Supp 3d at 1181 (citation omitted). "[F]ragmentary words and phrases" do not count towards any claimed similarities. *Stern v. Does*, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1040 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (citation omitted), *aff'd sub nom. Stern v. Weinstein*, 512 F. App'x 701 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, Plaintiff's sole example

of shared dialogue between the works—the single two-word phrase "a prostitute" (FAC ¶ 14)—is woefully inadequate. *See also* Dkt. 27 at 18-19.

In opposition, Plaintiff attempts to bolster this claim by proffering two additional examples of similarly unprotected short phrases, but seeks to disguise this fact through the clever use of ellipses. An actual examination of these passages in context reveals no similarity. The passages Plaintiff identifies as containing "similarities in dialogue" (Opp. at 17) are reproduced in full here, with the words Plaintiff excerpted in her opposition underlined:

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Plaintiff's Novel		
"I'll be right back," I said. "Must hit the		
<u>Ladies Room</u> ." "I'm coming with you,"		
Esmeralda said." "No, no," I said.		
"Some things a girl has to do in private."		
"You never had to do that in private		
before," she said. "I need to talk to you		
about the thing." "You don't know what		
I'm doing in private," I said. "Well		
whatever it is, you've always done it in		
front of me before. I remember that time		
in Morocco" "Yes, yes, I know, but		
Morocco was the exception to the rule,"		
I said. "Whatever," Esmeralda said.		
"Look. I called—" "Must see a man		
about a horse," I said. "Back in a few."		
Ex. A at 231.		

Defendants' Novel

I look at him over my shoulder. "Okay." Our eyes meet and I know him well enough to recognize the look burning in his. He wants to kiss me—badly. He stares at my mouth like a starving man. But then he pulls back, looks around the room, remembers where we are. "Ezzy—mind Olivia for me a bit?" "Yeah sure." She nods and Nicholas walks away. But fifteen minutes later, he still hasn't come back. And Esmerelda spots a group of friends she hasn't spoken into "in ages." With a pat to my arm, she says she'll be "back in a jiffy" and she heads off to them." Ex. B at 201-202.

"I have to head to the little lads' room."

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"Don't leave Fredonia, Lucille. Stay³ here, marry Prince Cristoph and have the best life in the world with a million people who already adore you." Ex. A at 287.

"Don't go back to New York. Stay." Ex. B at 244.

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³ Plaintiff's opposition incorrectly and misleadingly places a period here to cut off the continued dialogue. Opp. at 17.

These passages plainly demonstrate that there is no "extended similarity of dialogue," *Silas*, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1181, and Plaintiff stretches her already strained credibility by contending otherwise.

Mood

On this motion, Defendants showed that Plaintiff's Novel has a comic mood,

On this motion, Defendants showed that Plaintiff's Novel has a comic mood, pointing to numerous scenes that are played for laughs, while Defendants' Novel has a more passionate mood, due to its focus on explicitly described sexual encounters. Dkt. 27 at 20. Rather than examining the works themselves – the operative point of analysis – Plaintiff turns to how the two Novels were designated by a popular online retailer of the books, noting that they were both placed in "romantic comedy" categories. Opp. at 18. But whether the Novels are placed on adjacent virtual shelves is irrelevant to the actual mood conveyed within them, and a comparison of the two makes clear that one is a PG-13 romantic comedy, while the other is a bodice-ripper that tells an explicit tale of intensely physical romance.

Setting

There is no dispute that Plaintiff's Novel takes place in Chicago, and in a fictional Franco-Germanic European country; while Defendants' Novel is set in New York City and in a fictional country in the British Isles. Again, Plaintiff resorts to abstraction to paper over these concrete differences, arguing that the settings are substantially similar because both works take place in a "large American city" and a "fictional European country." Opp. at 18. But, in fact, the Novels do not have *any* setting in common. As courts in the Ninth Circuit have declined to find substantial similarity of setting even when the works take place in the same city, *e.g.*, *Silas*, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1176, two works without any overlap in

settings cannot be considered substantially similar with regard to this extrinsic element. ⁴

Pace

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Plaintiff insists that the Novels are told at the same pace because the events in both transpire over five months. Opp. at 19. This entirely overlooks that Plaintiff's novel spends 310 of its 324 pages detailing a period of just over two months— Lucy's adventure begins in early June (Ex. A at 30), she travels to Fredonia in July (id. at 306), and returns home about a month later. (Id. at 310.) The remaining 14 pages of the novel skim over the next three months of her life, culminating in her happy reunion with Nick. It is far more accurate to say that the majority of Plaintiff's work takes place over a two month period. Marcus v. ABC Signature Studios, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (considering the duration of "the majority" of the action in a work when determining its pace). By contrast, the majority of Defendants' Novel takes place over a five month period. E.g., Ex. B at 260. Furthermore, Defendants' Novel features an epilogue that takes place eight months later. If Plaintiff insists that her Novel takes place over five months because it references a three month period in a rush at the very end, then it is only fair to say that the Epilogue of Defendants' Novel increases its length to 13 months. Either way, works' paces are not substantially similar.

Characters

Plaintiff boldly argues without basis that Defendants failed to explain why the characters identified in the Complaint that have "shockingly similar names" are

⁴ Plaintiff bizarrely argues that the settings are not a scenes-a-faire, observing that Defendants' Novel could have been set anywhere, such as a small American farm town with Olivia traveling to Mexico. Opp. at 18. But this makes no sense. Prince Nicholas would hardly look to party in a small farm town and Olivia could not follow Prince Nicholas to his home in Mexico, where there is no monarchy. Defendants' Novel rests on Prince Nicholas abdicating the throne so a monarchy is essential, thus the fictional Wessco.

not substantially similar. Opp. at 19. This is false. Defendants explained in detail why the characters are dramatically different. Dkt. 27 at 17-18. Indeed, "noticeable differences" between characters cut against a finding that they are substantially similar. *Silas*, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1177. Of particular emphasis in any analysis, as Plaintiff acknowledges, is a review of how the characters interact with other characters in the works. Opp. at 20 (citing *Hogan v. DC Comics*, 48 F. Supp. 2d 298, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (cited approvingly by *Cavalier v. Random House, Inc.*, 297 F.3d 815, 828 (9th Cir. 2002))). Here, the characters Plaintiff argues are similar in fact play very different roles in the Novels, and accordingly interact very differently with the other characters therein:

- "David," a hotel butler referenced in Defendants' Novel four times in passing (Ex. B at 85, 105, 112, 164) interacts with Nicholas and Oliva only once when taking their coats (*id.* at 85). In contrast, in Plaintiff's Novel, Lord "David" Henry Billingsley is the father of the royal lady whom the heroine impersonates, and she interacts with him extensively, sharing several intimate, emotionally intense conversations with him after she is hospitalized, and before her wedding. Ex. A at 124, 294.
- Tomas, the head of the Fredonian Secret Service in Plaintiff's Novel, is referenced once in conjunction with the heroine's appearance at an orphanage (Ex. A at 222); Tommy, referenced 35 times in Defendants' Novel is a long-time member of Nicholas's personal security team and has a close enough relationship with Nicholas to offer him romantic advice (Ex. B at 63).
- Lady Esmeralda, a close friend to the royal lady the heroine impersonates in Plaintiff's Novel is a major character in the story and shares intensely personal conversations with the heroine (*e.g.*, Ex. A at 280); "Ezzy," a friend

⁵ As Defendants explained in their moving papers, Plaintiff misstates the similarity of the names. Dkt. 27 at 17 n.9.

- of Nicholas's, is referenced in only two scenes in Defendants' Novel and makes conversation with the heroine at a cocktail party (Ex. B at 200).
- As Plaintiff admits, Lucy in her Novel is the heroine, who is the sole narrator and drives the story by interacting with all other characters referenced. Lucy in the Defendants' Novel, however, is just an old flame of Nicholas's. She appears once at a party and speaks briefly to the heroine. Ex. B at 200.
- Finally, Nick interacts with the heroine in Plaintiff's Novel as part of a love triangle—the royal lady she is impersonating is betrothed to his older brother, Crown Prince Cristoph. The heroine nearly marries Cristoph, but leaves him at the altar due to her feelings for Nick. Ex. A at 305. In Defendants' Novel, Prince Nicholas is the heroine's sole love interest, and he abdicates his throne to marry her. Ex. B at 287.6

At bottom, these characters have nothing in common beyond minor similarities in their names, and are not substantially similar. *Cavalier*, 297 F.3d at 828.

B. Plaintiff's Selection-and-Arrangement Argument Fails.

Having failed to establish that any protectable elements of Plaintiff's Novel were actually duplicated in Defendants' Novel, Plaintiff in the end contends that the "totality" of common unprotectable elements still merits a finding of substantial

⁶ See also Dkt. 27 at 18 (further explaining the differences between Plaintiff's Prince Nick and Defendants' Prince Nicholas). Plaintiff's observes that "of all the princes in the world that Defendants could have selected to play the hero, they chose 'Prince Nicholas'" (Opp. at 20), but ignores that Nick/Nicholas is hardly a unique name, as is evident by the countless other romance novels that also feature "Prince Nicholas" as the love interest. See, e.g., RJN, Dkt. 28, at 5-6 (collecting examples). And her attempt to distinguish Hogan v. DC Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 311, is unavailing. There, the court failed to find substantial similarity even when the names at issue were identical and highly original, because of other distinctions between the characters. Here, the names are even less similar and the characters are more distinct. As in Hogan, the characters here are not similar.

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similarity. Opp. at 15. Plaintiff hangs this argument on the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Metcalf*, 294 F.3d 1069, which repeatedly has been limited to its particular facts. *Metcalf*'s result was driven by the plaintiff's showing of a particular and detailed overlap of a strikingly similar sequence of events, involving nearly identical characters: in both works at issue in *Metcalf*, a young muscular black surgeon turns down a lucrative opportunity in private practice to work in the inner-city hospital near his childhood home and breaks up with his young professional girlfriend to date a mid-thirties, divorced, childless hospital administrator, all while the hospital's reaccreditation bid is opposed by a Hispanic politician. *Metcalf*, 294 F.3d at 1073-74.

Here, Plaintiff offers no comparable chain of concrete characters and events that are the same in Defendants' Novel. She cannot state a claim for infringement on a selection-and-arrangement theory simply by again offering lists of abstract similarities with no effort to move from the general to the specific. Indeed, *Metcalf* itself clarifies that a theory based on "random similarities scattered throughout the works" does not pass muster. Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1074-75 (quoting Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 825). The Ninth Circuit has made clear that these random, scattered similarities are insufficient to support a claim of substantial similarity because they are "inherently subjective and unreliable." See Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1356. Rather, "a combination of unprotectable elements is eligible for copyright protection only if those elements are numerous enough and their selection and arrangement original enough that their combination constitutes an original work of authorship." Satava, 323 F.3d at 811 (distinguishing Metcalf).

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⁷ "Courts since *Metcalf* have been reluctant to extend such a claim to situations where the overlap between the nonprotectable elements were not quite as significant." 8th Wonder Entm't, LLC v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 2016 WL 6882832, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2016). Accord Zella, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1138 (same; collecting cases).

Underscoring Plaintiff's reliance on the most abstract description of the respective works, coupled with random commonalities scattered throughout the works—many of which stretch the definition of similarity to its breaking point—Plaintiff argues that Defendants "stole" her original selection and arrangement of the following sequence of events: heroine travels from her American metro hometown to a fictional European city, later to return home, with a prince in pursuit. Opp. at 21. This argument fails for two reasons.

First, the sequence of events that Plaintiff purports to have "created" is too

First, the sequence of events that Plaintiff purports to have "created" is too generic and abstract to constitute an original selection and arrangement that merits copyright protection. "American woman travels to Europe and is pursued back to her home city by her royal European lover" is no more than an unprotectable plot premise. See, e.g., Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding unprotectable the "basic plot premise" of "an American war veteran [who] travels to Japan in the 1870s to train the Imperial Army in modern Western warfare"). Plaintiff cannot seriously contend that she owns such a basic plot idea.

Second, Plaintiff dramatically misstates the Novels' sequence of events, highlighting only the ones that are remotely similar and conveniently leaving out the radically different series of events that happen in between the three she has highlighted. For example, in Plaintiff's Novel, in between traveling to Fredonia and returning home, Lucy accepts a proposal of marriage from the Crown Prince, plans a wedding, survives a murder attempt, falls in love with the Crown Prince's brother, and dramatically reveals herself as an imposter during her televised state wedding. In Defendants' Novel, the sequence of events between Olivia's journey to Wessco and her return home to New York City is dramatically different—Olivia and Nicholas plan for her to stay in Wessco as his mistress, but she returns to New York after Nicholas incorrectly blames her for leaking highly personal information about his teenage years to a tabloid. These entirely distinct sequences are in stark contrast to the detailed overlap in plot points and sequence of events that existed in Metcalf.

Metcalf's striking and objective similarities do not compare with the abstract, scattered similarities Plaintiff alleges are shared by the works at issue here.

Finally, Plaintiff's selection-and-arrangement argument does not gain traction when she observes that the Novels have similar themes and that themes play into the *Metcalf* analysis. Opp. at 17 n.8. This claim is inconsistent with *Metcalf*'s central premise that "the particular sequence in which an author strings a significant number of unprotectable elements can itself be a protectable element." *Id.* at 14 (quoting *Metcalf*, 294 F.3d at 1074). A theme, which Plaintiff agrees is the "unifying or dominant" idea inherent in a given work (Opp. at 16), is not the type of objective elements that are capable of being strung together in a sequence. Unsurprisingly, Plaintiff cites no cases where courts find unprotectable themes contributed to a court's finding of substantial similarity.⁸

IV. CONCLUSION

One need only read Plaintiff's Novel and Defendants' Novel to surmise that the works are substantially *dissimilar*, and accordingly, that Defendants have not infringed Plaintiff's Novel. For all the reasons set forth above, and on this motion, this Court should dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint with prejudice, and should award Defendants their costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505, in an amount to be determined by subsequent motion.

⁸ Plaintiff's opposition does not even address Defendants' arguments against her cursory claims for contributory and vicarious infringement, and accordingly concedes that those claims must be dismissed along with her direct-infringement claim. *Compare* Opp. *with* Dkt. 27 at 21 n.13.

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