Ebook Price-Fixing – Point and Counterpoint

This content has been archived. It may no longer be accurate or relevant.

We’re getting pretty close to the end of posts about the antitrust suit against the Price-Fix Six until something else happens.

Here are diverging views on the merits of the suit from two law school professors.

First, Professor Daniel Crane:

The book publishers felt that Amazon was devaluing the e-book market in order to promote its proprietary systems and technology. They feared that Amazon’s low e-book pricing would condition consumers to expect low e-book prices forever — that it would poison the well. Because Amazon was initially the only game in town for e-book distribution, the publishers had little power to resist Amazon’s demands. The advent of the iPad (and to a lesser extent the Nook) emboldened the publishers to demand different terms of dealing with Amazon.

Here is where the narrative becomes contested. The DOJ says that in late 2008 the publishers began to conspire with one another and eventually with Apple to force Amazon’s hand. The conspiracy allegedly began as a deal between Apple and the publishers. Under the terms of the deal, the publishers would set the ultimate retail price, which would be capped in several tiers based on the hard copy list price. Thus, for example, a bestseller with a list price below $30 could be sold for up to $12.99; one with a list price between $30 and $35 for up to $14.99. Amazon would collect a 30 percent royalty for distributing the book. Further, the publishers would agree to an unusual most favored nation (MFN) contract with Apple, providing that the publisher would guarantee to lower the retail price of each e-book in Apple’s iBookstore to match the lowest price offered by any other retailers, even if the publisher did not control the other retailer’s ultimate price to consumers.

. . . .

First, for purposes of modern antitrust analysis, it is critically important to distinguish between vertical and horizontal agreements. The complaint, of course, alleges a horizontal agreement, but most of the direct evidence alleged of the complaint seems to be of a series of vertical deals between Apple and the publishers. Assume that the government ultimately proves that the book publishers were all interested in moving to an agency model, that they had a number of discussions with each other about how to do that, and that Apple agreed to help by entering into a series of vertical contracts that would serve as the benchmark for other industry contracts. Under the US Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., a set of vertical resale price maintenance agreements with MFN clauses would be judged under the rule of reason, not the per se rule. [And the government would have a harder case to prove.]

. . . .

The DOJ will argue that there is ample evidence of horizontal agreement among the publishers since they clearly had many contacts on the subject of e-book pricing and coordinated their strategies with respect to Apple and Amazon. It is important here to distinguish between different subject matters of agreement however. An agreement to share information and pursue a common strategy to switch the industry from a wholesale model to an agency model — though a horizontal agreement — would likely be subject to the rule of reason as well. Unless the government can prove that the publishers actually agreed on e-book prices or a formula for setting e-book prices, the per se rule is unlikely to apply. If the rule of reason analysis applies, it’s off to the races.

Link to the rest at Jurist Forum

And, from Professor Harry Gerla:

The lack of agreement on price or price formula will not be some sort of magic bullet for the publishers. While Crane may call the agency arrangement a “common strategy” or a “model,” it is also a term of trade that at least one of the customers of the publishers, Amazon, found competitively significant. If the publishers, with or without Apple, agreed to only sell their e-books via the agency model, they were effectively fixing a term of trade. Going back more than 80 years to Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, in which there was an agreement among competitors to require arbitration clauses in their contracts with customers, agreements among competitors fixing terms of trade (at least where the terms were non-minor or had competitive significance) have been viewed with an extreme degree of suspicion, if not de facto treated as per se illegal. Indeed, the distinction between competitors jointly fixing the price term of a contract (or a price-related term such as the availability of credit in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.) and competitors fixing other terms of a contract is somewhat artificial. As anyone who has negotiated a complex contract can attest, the price term and price-related terms affect and are affected by all other terms in the contract.

. . . .

If the agency model is so beneficial and efficient, why did the publishers have to agree among themselves to use it? Apple certainly would not have objected to a demand by any individual publisher to use the model. According to the government’s complaint, Apple was strongly supportive of the agency model. About the only readily apparent explanation for the need for an agreement among the publishers on using the agency model is that, without an agreement to use the model, no individual publisher could be sure that the others would not give in to a demand by the 800 pound gorilla/customer in e-book retailing, Amazon, that the wholesaling model continue to be used. Once one or more of the publishers gave into Amazon’s demand that Amazon be allowed to set the price it charged for e-books, other publishers would be “forced” to go along with Amazon, and that once Amazon could resume selling e-books for $9.99, Apple could not sustain the $14.99 “agency” price for e-books. The problem with this explanation is that it is a claim that competition itself is bad, and at least since National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States that has not been an acceptable argument.

Link to the rest at Jurist Forum and thanks to Al for the tip.

11 thoughts on “Ebook Price-Fixing – Point and Counterpoint”

  1. Maybe I’m just too jaded, but honestly, does it matter if they win? Newspapers win the lawsuits against them all the time–you lose to the jury, because the average American hates the First Amendment, and then you win on appeal, because the First Amendment still exists.

    The problem is that getting sued is so expensive that after the win, the newspaper has to be sold or shuttered. You can have an army of $500-an-hour lawyers trot out the most amazing legal arguments to dazzle the judges, and at the end of the day, you’re still out the cost of all those lawyers. With this kind of thing, even if you win, you lose.

    • On the other hand, a lot of companies who lose (either for real or a Pyrric victory) deserve it.

      That said, I’m not sure it does matter other than the precedent. That is, with or without the DOJ, publishing is going to have trouble.

      It’s like the drunk’s spin out of control. He drinks a little too much, and his work performance goes down, which increases negative interactions and causes stress, and he drinks more, loses his job, drinks more, and runs his car into the boss’ car, and ends up in court.

      In many ways it doesn’t matter what happens in that court, because he’s not going to stop drinking until he hits bottom, if then.

      I don’t know how and where this “hit bottom” metaphor intersects with publishing. In some ways, I think it started to sink in for most of them a while ago, but they’d already done the stupid deed and have to pay the price.

      • I like the analogy, too. And to push it further: Even if the drunk does get off this time, it’s not like people should look at him and say, “Wow! Major victory! That guy totally has his life together! I should give him control of my financial future!” If he really had it together, he wouldn’t be in this situation to begin with….

  2. The book publishers felt that Amazon was devaluing the e-book market in order to promote its proprietary systems and technology

    This is just wrong. The publishers were worried about propping up the price of hard back books. This is a fact that the publishers freely admit. To the extent I understand antitrust law (IANAL), this substantially undermines Professor Crane’s argument.

  3. I have to admit, this stopped me cold: “Because Amazon was initially the only game in town….”

    WHY was Amazon the “only game in town”? Because Big Six publishers refused to support any of the “games” that went before. When they deigned to let a company like Fictionwise carry their stuff, they insisted on DRM and high prices and all sorts of things that just turned customers away.

    Amazon did what the publishers could have done but refused to do, and they benefited from it.

    (I would like to point out that Baen did extremely well with ebooks and continues to do so.)

  4. Has there ever been any other case where companies worked so hard to earn less per sale of their product? And has there ever been any other case where one of the “victims” (Amazon) has actually come out ahead, money-wise, due to the plot?

Comments are closed.